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Abstract 
As consumers rely on online customer reviews to assess the quality of products, firms often try to 
manipulate the reviews to attract consumers. If review sites fail to maintain reliability, firms are less likely 
to be motivated in improving quality of products. To alleviate fakery, online review providers have 
designed several identity disclosure mechanisms. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of 
identity disclosure on (1) reliability of online review systems and (2) subsequent efforts provision. We 
employ an incentive-aligned laboratory experiment based on a simple model of review systems. As theory 
of social pressure predicts, our results show that identity disclosure hurt the reliability of review systems, 
but not necessarily efforts provision. The current paper is a research in progress that aims to better 
understand the role of identity disclosure in online review systems. 
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Introduction 
Online customer reviews have been considered an important source of information to assess the quality of 
products. Prior studies (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Luca 2011) have shown that online reviews affect 
product sales across industries. Due to their importance, vendors often try to manipulate the reviews to 
pretend as they received great feedbacks, hurting reliability of the review sites (Trenz and Berger 2013). If 
the review sites fail to maintain reliability in providing honest feedback about the quality of products, 
firms are less likely to be motivated to invest efforts in improving their products. 
Identity disclosure of online users is one potential way to enforce the reliability of online reviews (see 
Villasenor 2014). To alleviate fakery, online review providers have designed several identity disclosure 
mechanisms. Some providers (e.g., Yelp, Amazon) offer a choice to voluntarily reveal the identity. Others 
(e.g., Airbnb, Google) enforce all online users to reveal their identity. Though online review providers 
expect that identity disclosure will ensure honest feedback from online users, the impact of identity 
disclosure on review reliability received limited attention and it is, as a result, controversial. On one hand, 
revealing identity would make online users feel responsible for their comments and leaving fake reviews 
would hurt their reputation. On the other hand, revealing identity may discourage users from giving an 
honest (negative) feedback especially when their comments could encounter legal and financial burden. 
Villasenor (2014) argues that people take fewer risks when their identities are known. If consumers avoid 
posting honest negative feedback, identity disclosure will eventually hurt the reliability. 
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The purpose of this research is to explore the role of identity disclosure on (1) reliability of online review 
systems and (2) subsequent efforts provision. We employ an incentive-aligned laboratory experiment 
based on a simple model of review systems. A unique aspect of our experiments is that we directly observe 
efforts decision by participants. This allows us to empirically test the effect of identity disclosure. Overall, 
we expect our study to offer insights for reliability of online review systems and efforts provision by 
identity disclosure. 
Research Background 
Mudambi and Schuff (2010) defines online customer reviews as peer-generated product evaluations 
posted on online review sites. Prior studies examined whether identity disclosure leads to reliable 
outcomes and improved quality in outputs. Blank (1991) showed that reviewers become more critical 
when their identity is hidden. McNutt et al. (1990) and Justice et al. (1998) found that hiding identity 
leads to slight improvement in perceived quality. Corgnet (2012) and Blank (1991) showed that existence 
of social relationship lowers reliability of evaluation process. Forman et al. (2008) argued that identity 
disclosure increases consumers’ perception about reliability. However, previous studies do not observe 
efforts, but perceived outcomes. Therefore, they cannot offer conclusive insights about empirical 
relationship between identity disclosure and the reliability of evaluation systems as well as subsequent 
efforts investment. 
To study the impact of identity disclosure, it is necessary to understand how it affects an individual’s 
social aspects. Villasenor (2014) says people want to be perceived positive, not negative, by others. 
According to the theory of social pressure, people care about their self-image just as they care about 
opinions of others toward themselves (Batson 1998; Freeman 1997). Thus, people often choose to do 
actions beneficial to others when their behaviors can be seen by others (Benabou and Tirole 2005). 
Applying such social aspects, this research follows recent studies that employ incentive-aligned 
experiments to test theories based on social/behavioral perspectives (Lim and Ho 2007; Lim 2010). 
Theory 
Peer Evaluation Game 
Following that online review system is a type of peer evaluation (Mudambi and Schuff 2010), we design a 
simple model of peer evaluation game where firms are competing where their shares are determined by 
reported scores from online users. 
The game consists of the following steps: 
1) Player i chooses an effort ei which ranges between emin=1 and emax=15. Player i incurs a decision 
cost c(ei)=kei2. That is, as high ei is chosen, decision cost increases at an increasing rate. 
2) Next, a reviewer j is assigned to the player i and observes the effort ei. Then, the reviewer j assigns 
a score si, which ranges between smin=emin and smax=emax to player i.  
3) At last, player i’s profit is determined as  = /(∑ ∈{,} ) ×  − (). 
Note that the reviewer j does not compete with the player i for the pie P. Also, the score assigned by the 
reviewer does not need to be the same as the effort chosen by the player. However, the reviewer knows 
that the player incurs high costs by choosing high efforts. 
Theoretical Prediction 
Based on the proposed model, a participant's behavior (i.e., efforts provision) can be predicted based on 
belief on reviewer’s reporting. Because player j’s payoff is not affected by reported score si to player i, 
reviewers do not have any incentive to inflate/deflate scores. Then, players will expect that reviewers 
report the score correctly (i.e., correct-reporting). We assume that players believe that reviewers will 
report scores as same as efforts (si=ei).  
Proposition 1. Players believe that reviewers report an objective score, which is the same as 
efforts chosen. 
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Following Proposition 1, we solve for a pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE). The 
expected profit of player i is defined on Equation (1). 
 =  ×  − () = 	

 ×  − () = ( + ) −  (1) 
Given the effort by counterpart -i, player i's efforts to maximize own payoff should be the solution of 
Equation (2). 
 !
  = ( + ) − ( + ) − 2 = 0 (2) 
The best response for player i's efforts ei*, given counterpart's efforts e-i, is the solution from Equation (2). 
We further refine NE by employing a symmetric pure-strategy (e*=ei*=e-i*). Then, we infer the following 
equilibrium efforts: 
∗ = % &'( (3) 
On the other hand, social pressure suggests that people have an intrinsic opinion to be nice under 
presence of social pressure (Batson 1998; Benabou and Tirole 2005; Freeman 1997). Unless being nice 
hurts own utility, reviewers will inflate participants’ scores (i.e, over-reporting). Thus, we assume that 
rational players believe that reviewers will report high scores regardless with efforts (si=smax). 
Proposition 2. Players believe that reviewers report a high score, regardless of efforts chosen, 
under presence of social pressure. 
Following Proposition 2, player i’s score si is determined as smax, not depending on player’s effort ei. We 
infer the following NE efforts: 
 =  ×  − () =

 ×  −   
 !
  = −2 = 0  
∗ = )* (4) 
Overall, identity disclosure will raise social pressure, leading to over-reporting behavior of reviewers. We 
argue that players rationally expect the reviewers’ behavior and, thus, invest NE efforts as predicted. 
Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Under identity disclosure, reviewers tend to over-report scores if social pressure from 
identity disclosure is sufficiently strong. 
H2:  Under identity disclosure, players choose lower efforts if players rationally expect 
reviewers’ behavior. 
Experimental Results 
Design and Procedure 
We test two “social conditions” Anonymous vs. Identity disclosure (anonymous: participants do not know 
each other; identity: participants were first asked to introduce themselves before experiments and, during 
the experiments, participants were shown name of their reviewer on the computer screen and vice versa). 
In addition to social condition, we introduce “repeated matching” (1-round: matching of counterpart and 
reviewer changes every round; 3-round: each participant will be matched with the same counterpart and 
the same reviewer for three consecutive rounds) as another dimension to compare the effect of short-term 
and long-term social pressure. Employing 2×2 design, our experiments consist of four treatments, varying 
in two dimensions. 
Parameters used are P=120, k=0.15. NE prediction is e*=10 under correct-reporting (Proposition 1) and 
e*=1 under over-reporting (Proposition 2). Expected profit is π*=45 and π*=59.85, respectively. 
Experiments were implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Participants of experiments 
consist of 108 undergraduate students at a large public research university in the United States. For 
 Identity Disclosure on Reliability and Efforts Provision 
  
 Twenty-first Americas Conference on Information Systems, Puerto Rico, 2015 4 
Anonymous 1-round treatment, we conducted three experimental sessions. Each of the rest three 
treatments consisted of two sessions. Each session had 12 participants with 15 decision rounds. Subjects 
received a course credit and cash payment based on their results of the game. 
Reporting Behavior 
For reliable evaluation systems, reported scores should reflect the actual efforts correctly. For each 
observation, we calculated the difference between received reported number (i.e., score) and efforts 
chosen. If the difference is over zero, player’s score is inflated (over-reporting). If negative, the score is 
deflated (under-reporting). Otherwise, correctly-reported. The proportions of under-, correct-, and over-
reporting occurrences for each treatment are reported on Table 1. 
Reporting behavior 
Anonymous Identity disclosure 
1-round 3-rounds 1-round 3-rounds 
Under-reporting 27.41 21.11 11.11 5.83 
Correct-reporting 41.67 59.17 24.72 21.67 
Over-reporting 30.93 19.72 64.17 72.50 
Table 1. Proportions of Reporting Behaviors 
In Anonymous, correct-reporting is most frequently observed at 42% (1-round) and 59% (3-round). In 
Identity, over-reporting accounts for more than 64% and 72%, respectively. The findings in reporting 
behaviors are in line with our expectation as shown on Propositions 1 and 2. That is, when identity is 
revealed, reviewers feel social pressure to be nice toward players. Therefore, evaluation systems are 
considered less reliable because it fails to reflect the true efforts. 
Another finding is that reporting behavior seems strengthened for a longer period of matching. Repeated 
matching seems to make reviewers form a stronger social pressure. For example, higher proportion of 
over-reporting in Identity 3-round suggests an increased social pressure due to expectation of a long-term 
relationship between reviewers and players. 
Efforts Provision 
We argued that players form a belief about reviewers’ behavior, eventually affecting their efforts 
provision. To understand what belief players form and how they react accordingly, we focus on efforts 
provision. 
Variable 
Anonymous setting Identity disclosure 
1-round 3-round 1-round 3-round 
Average Efforts 7.3 (4.11)* 7.6 (4.28) 8.2 (3.85) 5.6 (4.54) 
Median Efforts 8.0 8.0 8.0 5.0 
Average Score 7.5 7.6 11.4 11.7 
Median Score 8.0 8.0 14.0 15.0 
N 540 360 360 360 
* Number in parentheses are standard deviation. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Efforts and Scores 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics. Median efforts from four treatments are all lower than that of 
standard economics prediction (assuming objective-reporting, e*=10). This suggests that players suspect 
reliability of evaluation systems. For Anonymous 1-round and 3-round where correct-reporting is 
observed at a high rate, the median efforts are both 8. This high median efforts imply that players in 
anonymous settings generally hold a stronger belief that evaluation systems are still reliable at some 
extent. 
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Surprisingly, for Identity 1-round where scores are mostly inflated, the median effort is still 8. The 
average effort is at 8.2, even higher than both Anonymous treatments (7.3 and 7.6). This finding suggests 
a gap between players’ belief and reviewers’ behavior. While reviewers feel strong social pressure by 
revealing identity, players doubt that social pressure of reviewers will be enough to be nice. However, such 
doubt disappears when players recognize a long-term relationship. For Identity 3-round, the median and 
average efforts decrease into 5 and 5.6, respectively, the lowest level among all treatments. 
Variable Coefficient Robust SE t-stat. p-value 
Constant (base=Anonymous 1-round) 7.276 0.476 15.290 0.000 
3-round 0.296 0.753 0.390 0.695 
Identity disclosure 0.874 0.669 1.310 0.194 
Identity disclosure × 3-round -2.863 0.978 -2.930 0.004 
#obs.=1620, #clusters=108, R2=0.0443 
Table 3. OLS-Regressions on Efforts 
Table 3 compares the average efforts among treatments. We clustered standard errors at the subject level 
in analysis. Regression results suggest that difference in the average efforts among three treatments 
(Anonymous 1-round and 3-round, and Identity 1-round) is not significant. But, the mean effort in 
Identity 3-round is significantly lower. Although identity disclosure itself hurts the reliability, players’ 
investment in efforts will not be affected unless players expect a long-term relationship with the 
reviewers. 
Conclusion and Future Plans 
This research has several important theoretical and practical contributions. First, this is the first to 
observe efforts provision in the context of evaluation systems. Prior studies mostly focused on change of 
perceived outcomes in evaluation systems. Second, we found that the influence of identity disclosure 
hurts the reliability of evaluation systems as social pressure suggests (Batson 1998; Benabou and Tirole 
2005; Freeman 1997), but not necessarily the efforts provision. Third, this research extends a series of 
literature employing social preference in understanding various consumer behaviors (Lim and Ho 2007; 
Lim 2010). 
Although the current research pointed out several interesting findings, this research is still in progress. 
Our goal is developing a behavioral economic models that capture players’ behavior in full. Our current 
theoretical model does not explain/predict two findings. First, efforts provision should be driven by 
players’ belief on reviewers’ social pressure. Following recent studies incorporating bounded rationality 
into models (Ho et al. 2006; Ho and Su 2009), we will introduce a behavioral parameter that captures 
players’ belief. Overall, our findings help in developing a behavioral model to fully understand the role of 
identity disclosure in evaluation systems, which will offer insights in designing optimal online review 
systems. 
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